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Public Religion in Samson Raphael
Hirsch and Samuel Hirsch's
Interpretation of Religious
Symbolism
Ken Koltun-Fromm*
Department of Religion, Haverford College, 370 Lancaster Ave.,
Haverford, PA 19041, USA

Scholars of jewish thought have emphasized how modern jewish
thinkers reread, indeed reinvent, the public character of jewish
religious activity in the modern world. This essay will explore how
such rereading is a political activity, one that challenges prevailing
models of community, political status, and public religion. To gain
admittance into European culture, education, and society, many
nineteenth-century
German-jews adopted a religious rather than
national inheritance. They recognized themselves within a narrative of religious history divorced from national ties. But the stark
contrast between religion and nationality should not obscure the
political nature of jewish religious identity. 1 Nationalism was but
one form of political commitment. For two nineteenth century
German-jewish thinkers, the romantic turn to symbol offered
an interpretive guide to reconceptualize jewish religious politics.
The influence of the romantic concept of language and religion
on the Orthodox rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) is

*
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For a recent discussion of how religious arguments justifY political
commitments, see Ronald Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for
Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996).
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well known.2 Less so the romantic impact on the Reform rabbi
Samuel Hirsch (1815-1889), due in parr to the scholarly neglect
of his Luxembourg writings.3 For both, however, reinterpreting commandment and religion symbolically helped them to
reevaluate the interplay between politics and religion.
Though unrelated in name, and far apart in their understanding
of Jewish tradition, both Hirschs offered compelling accounts of a
Jewish public religion. Their symbolic readings of commandment
(S.R. Hirsch) and religion (Samuel Hirsch) emphasized the public
character of religious practice, and placed their religious interpretations firmly within the political debates then raging in
nineteenth-century Germany. This paper will focus on two
works - S.R. Hirsch's Guidelines to a jewish Symbolism (1857), and
Samuel Hirsch's Humanitarianism as Religion (1854) - that construe in various ways the nature of symbolism and its significance
for Jewish religious thought and practice.4 Both works are critical

2 See Isaac Heinemann, "The Relationship between S.R. Hirsch and his
Teacher Isaac Bernays (Hebrew)," Zion 16 (1951), pp. 62-69; David Sorkin, The
Transformation of German jewry, 1780-1840 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), pp. 165-168, where Sorkin points out the influence ofSchleiermacher and
Friedrich Creuzer on S. R. Hirsch's understanding of symbol and language.
3 See Jacob Katz, "Samuel Hirsch - Rabbi, Philosopher and Freemason,"
Revue des etudes juives 125 (1966), pp. 113-126. Scholars have been most
interested in Hirsch's Religionsphilosophie (1842), a 884 page response to Hegel's
philosophical interpretation of Judaism that was never completed. See Emil
Fackenheitn, "Samuel Hirsch and Hegel," in Studies in Nineteenth-Century jewish
lntelledual History, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1964), pp. 171-201; Michael Meyer, Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform
Movement in judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 72-74; Nathan
Rotenstreich, jewish Philosophy in Modern Times: From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 120-136; Hans Joachitn
Schoeps, Geschichte der jUdischen Religionsphilosophie in der Neuzeit (Berlin: Vorttupp,
1935), pp. 93-132; Eliezer Schweid, A History ofjewish Thought in Modern Times
(Hebrew) Gerusalem: Keter, 1977), pp. 234-263; and Max Wiener, judische
Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation (Berlin: Philo Verlag, 1933), pp. 131-147.
4 Samson Raphael Hirsch's essays on symbolic interpretation were published over the course of a number of years in the 1850s. The ground-breaking
methodological essays were published in 1857. See Samson Raphael Hirsch,
"Grundlinien einer judischen Symbolik," jeschurun 3 (1856/57), pp. 615-630,
andjeschurun 4 (1857/58), pp. 19-32. For an English translation, see Samson
Raphael Hirsch, The Collected Writings: jewish Symbolism, vol. III (New York:
Philipp Feldheitn, Inc., 1984). For a review of S.R. Hirsch's well known life
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texts for understanding the relationship between religious claims
and the socio-political context each author wishes to address, or
more accurately, to change. Rather than judging their symbolic
reading of text and tradition according to the romantic distinction
between symbol and allegory,S or a normative account of modern
Jewish philosophy,6 I want to underscore S.R. Hirsch and Samuel

and literary works, see Noah Rosenbloom, Tradition in an Age of Reform:
The Religious Philosophy of Samson Raphael Hirsch (Philadelphia: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1976), pp. 3-120, and Robert Liberles's more
perceptive study, Religious Conflict in Social Context: The Resurgence of Orthodox
judaism in Prankfurt am Main, 1838-1877 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985).
Also note Isaac Heinemann's fine articles on Hirsch's conception of "Torah im
Derekh Eretz", Jewish education and community, and the meaning of the
commandments. See Isaac Heinemann, "Studies on R. Samson Raphael Hirsch
(Hebrew)," Sinai 24 (1949), pp. 249-271, and Isaac Heinemann, Ta'amei haMitzvot in jewish Literature (Hebrew), vol. II (Jerusalem: Horev, 1993), pp. 91161. Samuel Hitsch's lectures to the Masonic lodge in Luxembourg were
collected and published as, Die Humaniti:it als Religion (Trier: C. Troschel, 1854).
For a review of Humaniti:it and its place within Hirsch's interpretation of Judaism,
see Katz, "Samuel Hirsch - Rabbi, Philosopher and Freemason," pp. 113-126;
and Gershon Greenberg, "The Historical Origins of God and Man: Samuel
Hirsch's Luxembourg Writings," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 20 (1975),
pp. 129-148. Also see Gershon Greenberg, "Samuel Hirsch: Jewish Hegelian,"
Revue des etudesjuives 129 (1970), pp. 205-215, for a quick biographical sketch.
5 See Heinemann's apologetic defense (Ta'amei ha-Mitzvot, vol. II, p. 111,
and especially fn. #114, p. 269) of Hirsch's symbolic interpretation of commandments, in which he blames nineteenth-century reform thinkers, themselves
critical of S.R. Hirsch's symbolic reading, for not attending to the romantic
distinction between symbol and allegory. Heinemann claims that Hirsch's critics
"did not see the difference between symbolic and allegorical interpretation.
Certainly the allegorical interpretation cancels the existence of the commandments, and one need not say how far Hirsch's theory is from this" (p. 269). This
dubious distinction has come under sharp criticism by recent scholars, in part
due to Paul de Man's influential essay, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in
Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of ContemporaryCriticism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 187-228. See David Dawson,
Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 11-17, and Frank
Talmage, "Apples of Gold: The Inner Meaning of Sacred Texts in Medieval
Judaism," in jewish Spirituality, vol. I, ed. Arthur Green (New York: The
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 314-355.
6 Note Fackenheim's conclusion that in his Religionsphilosophie, "Hirsch's
Jewish confrontation of Hegel ends in failure." This is so, Fackenheim tells us,
because Hirsch never asserts that "philosophy too must accept the otherness of
God, for the simple reason that God is other than the man with whom He yet
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Hirsch's hermeneutical strategy to create public space for Jewish
religious practice. Their symbolic readings are, despite their
differences, rhetorical maneuvers that justify continued Jewish
identity and practice in the hostile socio-political environment of
nineteenth century German culture. Religious discourse, for both
Hirschs, was a public activity, and one that actively challenged the
politics of emancipation, and the enlightenment ideals of equality,
toleration, and private religion.

Samson Raphael Hirsch: Commandment,
Symbol, and the Politics of Continuity
In his "Grundlinien einer judischen Symbolik" (1857),7 Hirsch
"draws up guidelines for a science [Wissenschaft]" of Jewish
symbolic interpretation
of the commandments.
Central to this
project is the establishment of the appropriate hermeneutical
rules that promise to solve "the most difficult problem in Jewish
knowledge" - the meaning of the commandments. The mitsvot,
Hirsch tells us, present the most difficult challenge for interpretive
strategies because their sophisticated meanings still remain obscure.
But his essay on Jewish symbolism belies a more general concern
with symbolic interpretation itself. Hirsch's theory of symbolic meaning is both a general theory of symbolic composition and interpretation, and a particular theory of Jewish symbolism. His essay moves
from a comprehensive account of symbolism to a more particular
reading of Jewish symbolic discourse. This "wissenschaftliche"
approach, one that begins with methodological concerns and only
then tackles exegetical questions, attempts to reveal the hidden
significance of Jewish religious observance. Hirsch's Guidelines is

enters into relationship .... " Contemporary religious thinkers must explore
the "possibility which Hirsch dismissed". See Fackenheim, "Samuel Hirsch
and Hegel," p. 201.
7 All translations are my own, and while following closely (at times) the
standard English translation in The Colletied Writings, there are a few significant
passages that cannot be found in the English edition. Citations will be noted in
the text with reference to volume and page number.
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a hermeneutics of disclosure, one that reveals the continuity of
meaning in Jewish public acts of religious observance.
For Hirsch, the academic study of Judaism (Wissenschaft) underscoresthe timeless and uniform meaning ofJewish ritual observance.
An appropriate academic approach to Jewish commandments
disclosesGod's intended meanings in symbolic ritual practice. But
Hirsch recognizes two potential hazards that correspond to his
two-fold division between methodology (general theory of symbol)
and exegesis (Jewish symbolism): (1) the danger of symbolic
interpretation itself, and (2) the failure to interpret Jewish commandments symbolically according to the demands of Wissenschaft.
The common symbolic understanding of commandment can lead,
Hirsch warns, "to the most serious danger for Jewish knowledge."
Here, Wissenschaft turns into "a simple game of wit [Witzel and
cleverness"in which any dimwit [Flachkopf], who lacks the proper
conceptual apparatus, can "only make a beginning," but never
provide foundational guidelines. Without the fitting methodological approach, the inner meaning ofJewish symbolism is forever
obscured. Hirsch's scientific analysis, to the contrary, yields "the
right method for the solution of our problem" (III, 615). Only
Hirsch's hermeneutical guidelines can remove common misunderstandings, while securing the true, unchangeable meaning of
commandment in the new authoritative discipline of Wissenschaft.
Rather than an opponent to the scientificstudy of religion, 8 Hirsch
intends to become its leading and most sophisticated practitioner.
Hirsch claims that his methodological section has two aims:
(1) uncover the rules of symbolic discourse in order to recognize
the appropriate material signs that correspond to true spiritual
ideas [Ideen], and (2) discover the ideas to which symbols refer.
The former study trains the student in the art of symbolization,
the latter in the recognition of meaning in the already created
8 For rhis view, common to many general studies of Hirsch's defense of
traditional Judaism and his critique of Reform, see Meyer, Responseto Modernity,
pp. 78-79, where Meyer claims that Hirsch could "spiritualize the law with the
hermeneutics of symbolic meaning. However, in the shape of historical criticism,
modern culture could too easily breach the fortress walls. It was therefore of the
utmost importance for Hirsch to launch a counterattack on Wissenschaft des

] udentums."
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symbol (III, 616). The first is to act like God and create symbolic
meaning; the second is to interpret the meaning of God's symbolic
world. Hirsch claims that he follows the second approach, providing guidelines for the discovery of meaning in the symbolic world
of commandment. Wissenschaft, in Hirsch's theory, is not a creative
discipline, but a process of discovery; its practitioners do not
produce new meanings, but rather discern the hidden symbolic
meaning of Jewish religious observance. The scientific study of
Judaism is itself a religious activity of disclosure.
But Hirsch's methodological section is instead an extended
discussion of the art of symbolization itself. Here, Hirsch is more
concerned with symbolic composition than symbolic interpretation. Wissenschaft, as understood in this first section, is the recovery
of God's intentions. Exegesis of Jewish scripture, in contrast, is the
discovery of the ideas to which symbols refer. A Jewish scholar,
therefore, must understand the way in which God creates symbolic
meaning before beginning exegetical commentary. For Hirsch,
knowing God's intentions is a necessary precondition for good
exegesis. Wissenschaft recreates the thoughts of God.
Hirsch's interpretation of Wissenschaft was at odds with the then
dominant view of Reform and historical school thinkers. Ismar
Schorsch has argued that Wissenschaft des judentums in nineteenth
century Germany shattered the "dogmatic type of historical
thinking" that was pervasive in Jewish historical research. This
new academic study was structured around five controlling principles: historical change and flux, the right of free inquiry,
expanding the sources used in historical analysis, research as a
synthetic, problem-solving activity (rather than merely exegetical),
and the desire to wrest Jewish history from Christian theological
critique.9 Hirsch directly attacked this type of new, scholarly
research. As a process of recovery and exposure, Hirsch's Wissenschaft
uncovered the "true spiritual ideas" that resisted incessant change
and progress. Free inquiry would be limited to those rabbinic
scholars who acquired both the academic and Jewish textual

9 Ismar Schorsch, "The Emergence of Historical Consciousness in Modern
Judaism," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 28 (1983), pp. 415-419.
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trammg necessary for "the right method". The rabbinic tradition -- the only tradition, Hirsch claims later, that accurately
perceived God's intentions - remained the authentic and authoritative source for historical inquiry. Hirsch's essays were indeed
driven by methodological concerns and problem-solving analysis.
Yet his methodology provided the guidelines for the heart of his
program: exegetical commentary of the Jewish commandments.
Indeed, Hirsch attacked the prevailing model of Jewish Wissenschaft
because it led to faulty exegesis of Jewish scripture.
Bur the definition of Wissenschaft was not only an internal
religious debate among Jewish interpreters of Torah. When in
1854 Hirsch published his Guidelines and defended an alternative
approach to the study of Judaism, he self-consciouslyentered an
explosive political debate concerning Jewish emancipation in
Germany. The rise of Wissenschaft coincided with the social movement for Jewish emancipation. Historical studies were political
statements, and were recognized as such. They often facilitated or
complicated Jewish social and political acceptance in Germany.
Leopold Zunz, in his groundbreaking historical study of Jewish
sermons, argued that emancipation and Wissenschaft were together
"the sources of the ethical life". The success of Jewish emancipation, Zunz thought, rested in part on the scholarly study of
Judaism. Equal political and social status for Jews and Judaism,
Zunz believed, would be accomplished through Wissenschaft.l0
In this light, Hirsch's study of the commandments can be understood
as a political and social challenge to reformist tendencies to debunk
rabbinic tradition and authority in order to secure social and
political equality. If Jewish history was indeed as open, expansive,
and fluid as Zunz, Jost, and Frankel had suggested, then Hirsch's
interpretive art of discoverywas an attempt to reign in and secure
a meaningful, foundational religious order that would thwart
progressive politics and modern social commitments. After all,
God's intentions do not bend to historical contingencies. Hirsch's
Wissenschaft would be a politics of reliability, harmony, and

10 Leopold Zunz, "Die gottesdientsdichen Vonrage, Vorrede (1832),"
vol. I in Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Louis Gerschel, 1875), pp. 32-40.
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authority, and one that would create the much needed public
sacred space for Orthodox religious observance.
Hirsch's image of the handshake as a natural symbolic gesture
reinforcesthis public, covenantal, and enduring feature of religious
observance. Symbolic expression is "natural", Hirsch claims, and
an eternal, necessary expression of human communication. Bodily
gestures are what Hirsch calls "natural symbolism": an expression
of thought through a material sign that is a "natural, inborn
ability, and a natural, inborn need" (III, 616). Unlike the oratory
farewell that is soon forgotten, Hirsch recalls "the moment" of a
silent handshake with a dose friend, in which "I am united with
him, a moment which I would gladly retain forever, and this
moment, in which I understand the full sadness that my parting
brings to him, I will never forget" (III, 616). Bodily symbolic
signs have the advantage over spoken words in their capacity to
make lasting impressions. Words are fleeting and are quickly
discarded: the "Augenblick" of the bodily gesture becomes a
"kurze Augenblicke" in linguistic discourse (III, 617). If one were
to express a thought or feeling in a "permanent sign that endures",
the spoken word would be of little help. The symbolic act arises
due to the lasting importance of a thought or emotion, and
the "intention to grant a thought or emotion a permanent sign"
(III, 617 -618). So God's symbolic commandments are not foreign
to human nature, but like bodily gestures, are the means by
which God communicates thoughts intended to make lasting
.
.
ImpreSSIOns.
Recall that in his methodological section, Hirsch does not begin
with the second (and stated intention) to offer guidelines for
symbolic meaning. Hirsch explores, instead, the nature of God's
symbolic discourse itself. At issue is God's use of symbols to
communicate information. A truly "wissenschaftliche" approach
to religious symbolism has to explain why God would choose to
reveal thoughts and emotions through symbolic signs and not the
spoken word. What of the revelation at Sinai, or Moses's prophecy? As we shall see, Hirsch is not unaware of such difficulties,
and will attempt to explain the special cases in which God speaks
not through symbol but directly through the spoken word. But he
still must provide a rational for symbolic discourse itself as a fitting
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medium for divine revelation. Symbolic acts retain an element of
permanence and stability lacking in the spoken word. Language is
fleeting and imprecise, but symbolic activity is repetitive, recalled
quickly and directly by memory. God's intentions are closely
related to human symbolic activity: just as God employs symbols
that impress thoughts and emotions permanently in the human
mind, so too human beings engage in symbolic activity in order
to "retain forever" the inner meaning of thoughts and emotions.
God's intentions are very human.
The handshake between two close friends is not a trivial model
for symbolic activity. It highlights the meaning and intention of
symbolic gesture, itself a symbol for the divine-human relationship. Hirsch's description of the handshake is a covenantal model
for religious devotion. It represents an intimate friendship that
unites the divine and human. But more than this, it is also
a methodological claim that concerns the academic study of
Judaism. The handshake links the scholar of Jewish symbolism to
God's intentions. Imagining God as a dose friend, and recognizing
God's "full sadness" when these two friends part, enables the
scholar to understand God's intentions and accurately recover the
meaning of God's symbolic world. The handshake is a symbolic
bodily gesture that signifies the rabbinic scholar's capacity to
accessGod's intentions. It is as much a claim for an eternal Jewish
covenant as it is an appeal to hermeneutical authority.
The public character of the Jewish covenant, symbolized in
the handshake between two friends, is maintained by the fitting
rabbinic interpretation of Jewish symbolism. Symbolic meaning is
not discovered, but like the handshake, enacted. The art of
symbolization is an activity, a composition, an imitation of God's
symbolic creativity. This kind of religious devotion requires public
space for shared communal activity. Hirsch, who defends the commandments by interpreting their symbolic meaning, recognizes
the need for public religious worship. The performance of each
commandment is a public handshake between Jews and their God.
The handshake is not a religious act, but a symbol for what
commandments do. Hirsch argues that the handshake, like all
bodily gestures, is not sufficiently precise for divine symbolic
communication. God requires unambiguous signs to communicate
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"objective concepts". Bodily gestures express thoughts or emotions
only in a "subjective" manner. The meaning of handshakes, tears
and laughter, varies from "Volk zu Volk". Thus, while making
more lasting impressions than the spoken word, these "natural"
symbols still lack the coherence and uniformity required for
"objective concepts". Hirsch defines symbolic acts as, "sequences
of physically perceptible signs, all of which should bring to
expression one and the same thought, one and the same emotion"
(III, 618). Bodily symbolic acts cannot do this. The handshake,
still a provocative model for the divine-human encounter, signifies
a multiplicity of possible meanings. It therefore fails Hirsch's test
to provide one and the same thought and emotion. Where the
natural symbol is "subjective" and imprecise, the religious symbol
is "objective" and universal, revealing "ideas, truths, teachings, and
principles" to a unified society (III, 618):
Signs and symbolic activity are introduced as means of expression whenever a
fact or doctrine, a truth or principle of obvious importance must be refreshed
and made permanent, through repetition, in knowledge and recognition. This
is true especially where the knowledge and recognition are to be realized by a
mass of people, a collectivity, or a nation (III, 620).

It is not sufficient to merely "record" the fact, or pronounce the
teaching, truth, or principle. Instead, one "grasps the knowledge of
these teachings in a specific, suitable symbolic activity, which the
collectivity, the people, are called to perform at specific recurring
periods." Natural symbolicgestures are still too fleeting, temporary,
and personal for the education of a nation. While the bodily gesture
still involves "one's whole body, one's whole being", it lacks the
power of "permanent signs, the continuance of which is secured in
memory." For objective,universalstatements of truth, human beings
require religious symbolism. The recognition of God's symbolic
world is a political and communal act of religious education.
The language of continuity, permanence, and coherency run
throughout Hirsch's interpretation of religious symbol. They are
significant goods for an Orthodox religious Jew who recognizes
that the progressive politics of emancipation are eroding public
space for Jewish religious observance. Symbolic activity is a collective, public practice, and one that maintains a secure continuity
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with the past in the face of an uncertain future. Hirsch understands that religious reform begins with recognizing discontinuities
in religious traditions. He therefore turns away from historical
studies in order to provide a more stable base for religious practice.
Hirsch's critics were quick to challenge his drift away from
historical inquiry as an evident disregard for the standards of
rational critique. 11 But to Hirsch, the coherence and uniformity of
symbolic activity cannot be anchored in historical studies. Instead,
the religious scholar must look to "the intention [Absicht] of the
one who commanded the symbol":
The first condition to find our way to an understanding of a symbol is to
ascertain the intention [Absichc], that is, whether the author intends an object
or phenomena to be a symbol in order to express an idea (III, 622).

Without the knowledge of the author's intention, interpretation is
nothing but a "subjective, trifling joke" without value and objective reality. This, as Hirsch explained earlier, is the "unwissenschaftliche" interpretation of common dimwits. The scholar should
determine whether, to begin, a symbolic reading is necessary, then
which objects or activities should be interpreted figuratively, and
finally whether the symbol carries religious meaning. One can
understand an anchor at the waterfront according to its "primitive
meaning", and argue that it is merely a tool to secure a boat in
the harbor. But one can also interpret it according to its "symbolic
meaning" if the anchor is so small that it would be ill-suited to
moor the vessel. The "primitive meaning" is ruled out according
to functional criteria (the anchor is simply too small to secure
the vessel). For the anchor to have symbolic significance, it is
due, Hirsch claims, "to the choice and intention conferred upon it"
(III, 624). But the anchor's significance is open to "the most
varied interpretations", only one of which is the true one. How
does the scholar distinguish the one correct interpretation from the
various possibilities? The scholar discovers, "the one intended by

11 See, for example, Abraham Geiger, "Neunzehn Briefe tiber Judenthum,
von Ben Uziel: eine Recension," Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fur judische Theologie
2 (1836), pp. 351-359, 518>-548.
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the author who chooses this particular object or activity as an
expression of a particular idea" (III, 624). Only knowledge of
God's intentions will secure the precise meaning for religious
symbols. 12
Hirsch dearly does not want to abandon historical inquiry
altogether. While emphasizing authorial intent, the local and
historical background to symbolic composition still plays a formative role in the interpretive process (III, 625). A sentence torn from
its historical context (what Hirsch calls a "herausgerissenen Satz")
can lead to competing and conflicting interpretations. Indeed,
symbolic interpretation practiced by the "unsystematic" thinkers
leads to both wrong and multiple interpretations. The story of
the serpent in Genesis 3: 14 could have both a natural or figurative meaning. If symbolic, Hirsch asks, how does one determine
whether the serpent symbolizes the earth, temptation, ttuth, or
cleverness? Only when the symbol or symbolic activity is studied
within its historical and local context will it lose much of its
ambiguity. Determining the fitting context delivers uniformity
and precision. Ten commentators, Hirsch admits, can offer ten
competing interpretations of the same text, but Hirsch will accept
only the one that accords with his contextual approach (HI,
626-628). But Hirsch's contextual reading is, in the end, historical dressing for authorial intent. Only the knowledge of the
author's intention will avoid the dangers of pluralism, and secure
the one true symbolic meaning. The intentions of God are the
foundations upon which the religious scholar justifies a coherent
and uniform interpretation of symbolic activity.
Hirsch's desire to protect a single and uniform meaning is most
apparent in his argument that symbols cannot impart new information or truth to the one who receives it. A symbol, instead, must be
recognizable within a limited social, cultural, and religious framework:
The meaning of the symbol can move only within a circle of thought in which
general acquaintance between the one who imparts the symbol and the one who

12 For a modern literary discussion of authorial intent and its significance
for interpretation, see E.n. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1967).

Public Religion in S.R. Hirsch

81

receives it is already established. A symbol cannot be communicated to a
recipient in which the symbol expresses a truth that is completely new to him
(III, 629).

A known concept is brought together, in a new relationship, with
a known object, through symbol. This "is the highest degree of
newness that can be imparted by a symbol ... To reveal a
completely unknown mystery is impossible by means of symbol"
(III, 629-630). To recognize a symbol as a symbol, one must
already be within a framework of meaning in which it makes sense
to relate a particular object to an already comprehensible idea or
ideal. There must be a background of meaning and relationship
that underlies symbolic recognition. Furthermore, the context of
meaning makes clear the possible candidates signified by the
object. The scholar of religious symbolism narrows the possible
meanings to the one intended by the author.
Hirsch's Wissenschaft is the religious re-discovery of God's
intentions. This hermeneutical theory, I am arguing, is an apologetic for his political and religious commitments. Just as the
Wissenschaft scholar discovers, rather than creates meaning, so
too God discloses hidden rather than new truths. For both God
and the religious scholar, symbols confer new relationships,
but not new ideas. The scholar does not create meaning out of
chaos, but discovers it in an already ordered and meaningful
world. Apparently God, too, is a good Wissenschaft scholar: God
does not create meaning so much as reveal the meanings already
inherent in a particular cultural, political, and intellectual climate.
When these meanings are particularly important to remember
through repetition, symbolic activity is most efficacious. God
instructs "a mass of people, a collectivity, or a nation" in order to
create a political community that recognizes the now disclosed
truths through repetitive symbolic gesture. Religious symbolism
has become political activity, one that unites a community
with God in a public handshake. The scientific investigation of
God's symbolic world is the imitation of divine symbolism and
divine politics. Religiousstudy, like politics, is the art of retrieving
the hidden order of God's symbolic world. Wissenschaft is the
method through which the religious scholar enters political debate.
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It is a politics that mirrors the order and security of God's symbolic
universe, and a politics that defends the needs of a religious
community struggling against Jewish pluralism.
For his hermeneutical theory to be effective at all, Hirsch
must argue that symbols only disclose known truths. Wissenschaft
demands that local, historical context generates possible candidates
for symbolic meaning. If God's symbolic communication were to
reveal new meanings, then Hirsch's contextual approach may
prove unreliable. Perhaps nothing in the "personal, local, and
historical" field could help explain a radically new meaning. Even
more dangerous, God's intentions might well be beyond human
understanding. If authorial intent is necessary to understand
symbolic meaning, then God must conform to human modes of
activity and thought. It is not coincidental that in the description
of the "general acquaintance" between author and receiver of
symbol, the model of the friendly handshake returns. God's
intentions are not mysterious to the scholar of religious symbolism,
for he is the true defender of Jewish religious observance and the
stable political order that makes such observance possible.
With his methodological section as a guide, Hirsch turns to the
particular problem of Jewish symbolism. Hirsch has carefully
prepared his readers for this transition, for he has argued that
symbolic meaning is limited to political communities. Only within
these polities will religious symbolism make sense. This both
justifies a Jewish religious symbolism, and protects it from alternative readings. Hirsch's real concern lies with the "modernists",
who attack symbolic interpretation because the Jewish law is
to them a "burden". Though the lawgiver surely intended these
laws for Jews of the past, the "modernists" claim that they have
now lost their meaning. When one discovers religious meaning,
wherever it may be found, the symbolic "shells" are easily
discarded. Hirsch responds, to the contrary, that even what
appears superficial or external to the meaning of commandment
instead "raises high above all the changes in time and place
through the eternity of the idea that is inherent in them" (IV, 21).
One cannot distinguish the symbolic meaning from the symbolic
act. The true ideas to which the symbol refers "dwell" or are
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"inherent" [innewohnenden] in symbolic activity itself. These
ideas, as we have seen, are discovered through a sympathetic
interpretation of authorial intent. The "modernists", unconcerned
with authorial intent, misunderstand symbolic discourse. There is
certainly historical progress and transformation, Hirsch is arguing,
but the symbolic context of meaning is secure, anchored, as it
were, in God's original intent.
In the methodological section of Hirsch's essay, symbols express
[ausdrucken] a truth or principle. Here, in his account of Jewish
symbolism, they are now the carriers of "Inhalt". The German
word "Inhalt" can mean both "meaning" and "content". Significantly, symbols and symbolic activity no longer point to ideas,
but are the carriers of the ideas themselves. Access to true
principles is available only through the symbol. Symbolic activity
is not, as many "modernists" believe, a burden and "meaningless
shell", but an integral, indeed essential performance of religious
truths. Now understood as the carrier of eternal truth, symbolic
activity is itself, like the truth contained within it, eternal and
"raised above" the ravages of historical change. The progressive
politics of the "modernists" cannot harm nor undermine divine
symbolism.
To further protect religious truth from historical contingency,
Hirsch appeals to God's divine revelation to Moses at Sinai. God
communicates "Wahrheit" (truth) to humanity by means of
religious symbols (IV, 29). Yet God speaks to Moses "mouth to
mouth". Only at Sinai is "Wahrheit" communicated directly and
immediately in words without symbolic gloss:
His [Moses's] mission required - and therein lay his greatness - that God did
not speak with him through symbols, but rather Moses had to bring the
immediate, unmediated word of God, his law, to the people (IV, 184).

With other prophets, God informs through "Vermitdung symbolischer Erscheinungen" (the mediation of symbolic appearances),
such that each prophet "must clothe them [the true principles] in
his own words" (IV, 184-185). But at Sinai, words express
immediately and perfectly what symbols would only disclose
vaguely and imprecisely. In addition, God's revelation is radically
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new. According to Hirsch's definition, God could not reveal
new information through symbol, for symbols produce new relationships, but not new meanings. God's law is not "entrusted"
in symbols because symbols do not adequately manifest the
pristine uniqueness and immediacy of God's word. By placing
the "unmediated word of God" beyond symbolic meaning and
historical context, Hirsch minimizes interpretive strategies that
could undermine the uniqueness of Moses's prophecy and the
revelation at Sinai. Progressive politics, and the religious critique
essential to it, is thwarted by Hirsch's appeal to immediacy and
uniqueness. By speaking to Moses "face to face", God recognizes
the limits of Wissenschaft. It is a handshake between friends that,
in this moment of divine and human encounter, transcends
historical contingency.
Sinai is, however, but one moment in divine revelation. The
whole Torah (the five books of Moses) reunites the Jewish people
with God's original purposes. In a long footnote to the eighteenth
letter in The Nineteen Letters (1836), Hirsch compares the study of
nature with the study of Torah:
One word here concerning the proper method of Torah investigation. Two
revelations are open before us; that is, nature and the Torah. [For both there is
only one method of research.] In nature all phenomena stand before us as
indisputable facts, and we can only endeavor a posteriori to ascertain the law of
each and the connection of all . .. The same principles must be applied to the
investigation of the Torah. [Fact is Torah to us like heaven and earth; as fact
the Torah's ordinances lie before us.] In the Torah, even as in nature, God is
the ultimate cause. In the Torah, even as in nature, no fact may be denied, even
though the reason and the connection may not be understood. What is true in
nature is true also in the Torah; the traces of divine wisdom must ever be sought
for. Its ordinances must be accepted in their entirety as undeniable phenomena ... So, too, the ordinances of the Torah must be law for us, even if we do
not comprehend the reason and the purpose of a single one. Our fulfillment of
the commandments must not depend upon our investigations. Only the
commandments belonging to the category of Edoth, which are designed to
impress emotional and intellectual life, are incomplete without such research. 13

13 Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Nineteen Letters, ed. Jacob Breuer
Qerusalem and New York: Feldheim Publishers, 1%9), fn. #6 to eighteenth
letter, pp. 143-144; Samson Raphael Hirsch, Igerot Tzafon: Neunzehn Briefe uber
Judenthum (Altona: J.F. Hammerische, 1836), p. 96. Sentences in brackets
[ ] appear in the original German but not in the English translation.
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Torah, like nature, consists of undeniable facts.14 But the "Edoth"
(the Hebrew word for "testimonies"but what Hirsch calls "symbolic
activity") need "Forschung" (research) for their own clarity and
intelligibility. If the "Edoth" are incomplete without interpretive
gloss,it appears that much of the written text requires exegesis.This
is clear in Hirsch's account of oral and written Torah:
Thus the Written
are permeated by
written word; and
being depends on

Law seeks to be celebrated only in a company of men who
the living breath of the Oral Law, which is divine like the
in this way the Written Law itself makes it clear that its very
the existence of the Oral Law. 15

Hirsch implies that the written Torah is not an integral, selfcontained text, but rather that its source of authority ("its very
being") lies in the divinity of the oral tradition, and those
"permeated by the living breath of the Oral Law". Symbolic
reading of the commandments completes what is "incomplete" in
the written text. Hirsch's own detailed, symbolic commentary has
become oral Torah. His symbolic reading reproduces the thought
of God.
Hirsch's discussion of tefillin offers a helpful illustration of his
symbolic method at work. 16 Tefillin is an example of "Edoth". In
Horeb (1837), a compendium of Jewish law and its meaning,
Hirsch argues that wearing tefillin expresses four (and only four)
essential Jewish beliefs: (1) God delivered the Jews from Egypt
(the basis [GrundlungJ of Judaism), (2) service to God maintains

14 For a similar description of Torah as factual data that is unchangeable
and permanent, see Samson Raphael Hirsch, Horeb (New York: The Soncino
Press, 1962), p. 20, paragraph #34; Samson Raphael Hirsch, Horeb: Versuche
uber jissroels Pflichten in der Zerstreuung (Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann,
1921), p. 17, paragraph #34.
15 Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Collected Writings, vol. I (New York:
Philipp Feldheirn, 1984), pp. 195-196. Jay Harris understands Hirsch's
interpretation of oral Torah as a response to the burgeoning historical school
and the partial relativization of midrash halakhah by Frankel, Graetz and
Geiger. See Jay Harris, How do we know this?: Midrash and the Fragmentation of
Modern judaism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995),
pp. 157-210,223-228,
especially pp. 225-227 on Hirsch's understanding of
oral Torah.
16 Hirsch, The CollectedWritings: jewish Symbolism, pp. 140-161.
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human life (the implementation [Verwirklichung] of Judaism),
(3)] ews must take to heart [Verherzigung]the fulfillment ofIsrael's
mission, and (4) tefillin serves as a memorial [Denkmal] for Jews
and non-Jews throughout history. 17 Both in Horeb and in Hirsch's
biblical commentary, one finds intricate and detailed interpretations of the precise meaning of tefillin, even its very shape and
material.18 For example, the shape of the "bayit" (the "house"
which is worn on the forehead) is square, and not round, because,
of all the creative organic forces it is only the energy of man, who thinks and
acts freely, that constructs linear or angular forms. We therefore maintain that
the circle characterizes the structures produced by organic forces not endowed
with a free will, while angles and squares are hallmarks of man.

The "bayit" must be square, for human beings are endowed with
freedom, and "the square is the mark of human freedom which
masters the material world". God wishes to remind human beings
of their freedom, and their responsibility (to God) to exercise it.19
In Hirsch's symbolic theory, human beings rediscover God's
intentions and the truths conveyed through symbolic activity.
Hirsch's forced symbolic readings did not escape his contemporaries. Two reform rabbis, Abraham Geiger and Gotthold Salomon,
reviewed Hirsch's The Nineteen Letters in Geiger's journal.20 Geiger
claimed that Hirsch imported "phantastisches Bildern" (fantastic
representations) and "fremdartigsten Anschauungen" (the most
foreign conceptualizations) into the category of "Edoth". He
questioned whether the Orthodox will truly believe in the divine
source of the commandments if they depended upon Hirsch's
reading of even "the smallest, most petty part of the ceremonies".
The commandments lose their plausibility the more "tortuous" and

17 Hirsch, Horeb, p. 176, paragraph #271; Hirsch, Horeb: Versuche uber
jissroels Pflichten in der Zerstreuung, p. 153, paragraph #271.
18 Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Pentateuch, vols. I and V (Gateshead:
Judaica Press, 1989), pp. 160-174 in first volume, and pp. 88-114, 182-192
in fifth volume.
19 Hirsch, The Collected Writings: Jewish Symbolism, p. 152.
20 Geiger, "Neunzehn Briefe tiber Judenthum," pp. 351-359, 518-548;
Gotthold Salomon, "Vertrautes Schreiben an einen Rabbi," Wissentschaftliche
Zeitschrift fur jUdische Theologie 2 (1836), pp. 417-435.
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convoluted Hirsch's "play with symbols" becomes.21 Furthermore,
if one is so engrossed in the symbolic activity, how can a "free,
grand thought or principle" arise at such a time? Here, Geiger's
pen is unsparing:
What good does all the clever and spiritual instruction do me, if every moment
of life hurls me into a dead mechanism [todten Mechanismus]. 22

The complete focus on the symbolic act impedes religious instruction, let alone Hirsch's questionable interpretations. Geiger calls this
"spiritual enslavement" [Geistesknechtshaft]:
not "Wissenschaft",
but the game of wits and cleverness that Hirsch promises to overcome. We require truth and knowledge, Geiger concludes, not
"unbegri.indeter Glaube". 23
Like Geiger, Gotthold Salomon also believes Hirsch's symbolic
interpretation leads to a "mechanischen Spiel". But Salomon is more
concerned with the appropriateness of symbolic interpretation itself. 24
He is, as Hirsch suspects, one of those "modernists" who argues that
"Judaism has nothing to do with symbols". Salomon fears that
symbolic interpretation opens the door to "fantastical pictures":
If we are permitted a symbolic explanation, if we see in the serpent of Satan, or
in the tree of knowledge, something that cannot be perceived, then with what
right can we reject the many and ridiculous absurdities with which one or

21 Geiger, "Neunzehn
Briefe tiber Judenthum, von Ben Uziel: eine
Recension," WZJT 3 (1837), pp. 83--87. One modern scholar echoes Geiger's
critique: "The more volatile a rite and the weaker its observance, the more
strongly Hirsch defended it; the more precarious a ritual detail and the more
endangered its continuity by abuse or disuse, the more complex was Hirsch's
rationale urging its performance ... The more abstruse the rite and the more
unintelligible its observance, the more complex and weighty is Hirsch's
explanation." See Rosenbloom, Tradition in an Age of Reform, p. 203. Also note
Nathan Rotenstreich's critique that Hirsch formulated rational meanings in the
form of symbolic interpretation for what had come to be seen as "irrational
religious activity". See Nathan Rotenstreich, Ha-mahashavah ha-yehudit be-et
ha-hadashah, vol. I (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1966), p. 120. Also see Arnold Eisen,
"Divine Legislation as 'Ceremonial Script': Mendelssohn on the Commandments,"
AJS Review 15.2, Fall (1990), p. 264, for a critique similar to Rosenbloom.
22 Geiger, "Neunzehn Briefe tiber Judenthum,"
WZJT 3, p. 87.
23 Ibid., p. 91.
24 Salomon, "Vertrautes Schreiben an einen Rabbi," p. 431.
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another church, with this or ten other interpretations, has put forth, or even
further (because the realm of the irrational is borderless) will put forch.25

Once symbolic interpretation is allowed, then Christian theologians could adopt similar hermeneutical strategies with very
different ideological agendas. Symbolic interpretation, to Salomon,
is imprecise, indeterminate, irrational, and dangerously ecumenical.
Echoing Geiger, Hirsch's symbolic reading is condemned as
"unwissenschaftliche" .
It is possible that Hirsch's Guidelines, written some twenty years
after The Nineteen Letters, attempted to respond to both Salomon
and Geiger's critique. We have noticed Hirsch's awareness
of "modernists" like Salomon who denied Jewish symbolism
altogether, in part because of its unwelcome implications. Indeed,
Hirsch's Guidelines promised to overcome this kind of fear and
denial. And, given the history of Hirsch's friendship with Geiger,
one can assume that Hirsch was not unaware of Geiger's critical
review.26 Yet Hirsch's Guidelines has done little to calm Salomon
and Geiger's skepticism. Even as he pursued a "wissenschaftliche"
approach to symbol, Hirsch secured the revelation at Sinai beyond
interpretive suspicion. His analysis of tefillin relied on questionable
generalizations concerning human "energy" and the philosophical
meaning of squared objects. At a time when his contemporaries
Frankel and Graetz discovered new rabbinic interpretive sources,27
Hirsch claimed to possess, in the "prophetic voice" so distasteful
to Salomon,28 the sole hermeneutical strategy for unlocking the
secrets of Torah.
We have seen that Hirsch's interpretive strategy was an attempt
to reduce error and ambiguity in symbolic interpretation. Through
an understanding of the author's intention, each religious symbol
revealed only one idea, truth, teaching, or principle. Multiplicity
of meaning was the mark of the "Flachkopf" who lacked the
appropriate scholarly skills and conceprual apparatus. Ambiguity

Ibid., p. 422.
See Liberles, Religious Conflict in Social Context, pp. 116-124.
27 See Ismar Schorsch, "The Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship," Leo
Baeck Institute Year Book 35 (1990), pp. 55 -71; and Schorsch, "The Emergence
of Hismrical Consciousness in Modern Judaism," pp. 413-437.
28 Salomon, "Vertrautes Schreiben an einen Rabbi," p. 417.
25

26
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and difference were to be avoided; objectivity, coherence, and
unity were to be procured. To know the intention of the author
who introduced the symbol was to secure the one appropriate and
correct meaning. David Sorkin and Isaac Heinemann have argued
that Hirsch's theory of symbol was influenced by the eighteenth
and nineteenth century expressivist traditions. The neo-humanist
romantics believed that through a close study of the Greek classics,
one could encounter the "spirit" (Geist) of the Greeks themselves.29 Schleiermacher, at least in his "technical/psychological"
theory, claimed that understanding the other is knowing that
other better than it knows itself.3o Surely, Hirsch's insistence upon
authorial intent was inspired by this romantic hermeneutical
tradition, even if it was somewhat distant from Schleiermacher's
discussion of intention and the hermeneutical circle.31

29 See Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry, pp. 156-167, and
Heinemann, "The Relationship between S.Il Hirsch and his Teacher Isaac Bernays
(Hebrew)," pp. 60-69. For a discussion of the Romantic conception of symbol
in eighteenth and nineteenth century Germany, see Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Truth and Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 147-173. For an
important critique of Romantic conceptions of symbol as "an act of ontological bad faith", see de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," pp. 187-228, and
David Dawson's insightful critique of de Man's interpretation of Coleridge in his,
"Against the Divine Ventriloquist: Coleridge and De Man on Symbol, Allegory and
Scripture," Literature and Theology4.3 (1990), pp. 293-310. For background to the
nineteenth century debate over symbol and allegory, see Dawson, AllegoricalReaders
and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria, pp. 11-17; and Tzvetan Todorov,
Theoriesof the Symbol (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 198-221.
30 F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, ed.
Heinz Kimmerle (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977). On Schleiermacher's
hermeneutical theory, see Hans Frei, The EcliPseof Biblical Narrative: A Study in
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1974), pp. 290-300; Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 48-54, especially p. 52 for
his critique of Frei's account; and Azade Seyhan's provocative reading that
Schleiermacher's "hermeneutical circle excludes the possibility of direct and total
representation". See Azade Seyhan, Representation and Its Discontents (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), pp. 96-104.
31 It is difficult to ascertain whether knowing the authors better than the
authors know themselves means for Schleiermacher that the interpreter must
understand authorial intent. On this point, see Frei's discussion in The Eclipse of
Biblical Narrative, pp. 295-300, and Seyhan, Representation and Its Discontents,
pp. 101-103, where she argues that the concept of understanding authors must
be interpreted from within the more limited claims and possibilities of
Schleiermacher's hermeneutical theory.
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Hirsch's theory of symbol is also, to my mind, a claim to
hermeneutical and political authority, and a defense of Hirsch's
rabbinic and university education. Unlike the "modernists", Hirsch
provides systematic guidelines for understanding God's intentions,
the time and place of the symbol's origin, and the local and
historical background. This is the context within which the
appropriate meaning of symbol is to be found, even if Hirsch's
reading of symbol is not always true to his theory. Only a
rabbinical scholar, trained in Jewish literature and the secular
studies of philology, history, linguistics, and philosophy, could
offer a sympathetic account of Jewish symbolism. If Hirsch's
Guidelines attempts to secure the one, true meaning of religious
symbol, then it is also a rhetorical strategy to protect his rabbinic
authority to discern God's intentions. Hirsch affirms and defends
both his education and the modern rabbinic institution in his
theory of symbolic interpretation. 3 2
The significance of Hirsch's hermeneutical theory is strongly
tied to the sociological and political landscape. Unconcerned with
Christian exegesis, Hirsch does not fear, like Salomon, that the
Hebrew bible is open to Christian subversion. In Hirsch's world,
Jewish symbolism is for Jews alone. Only within the context of
Jewish tradition and community can the meaning of commandment be understood: since symbols cannot impart new meanings,
Hirsch's symbolic readings are only for the initiated. Geiger,
believing in an underlying religious spirit that pervades all religious practice, rejects Hirsch's defense of Israel's particularity. 33
But if Geiger and Salomon are attuned to Christian exegesis and
the ethical implications of being chosen, Hirsch's concerns lie
elsewhere. With the increasing openness of German society to
Jewish civil and political involvement, even within his own
community in Frankfurt am Main, Hirsch's symbolic reading

32 On the emergence of the modern rabbinate, and Hirsch's place within
it, see Ismar Schorsch, "Emancipation and the Crisis of Religious Authority: The
Emergence of the Modern Rabbinate," in Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in
German-Jewish History, ed. Werner Mosse, Arnold Paucker and Reinhard Rump
(Tubingen: l.eB. Mohr, 1981), pp. 205-247.
33 Geiger, "Neunzehn Briefe tiber Judenrhum," WZJT 2, p. 541.
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secures a realm where Jewish commandment still retains force for
Jews wishing to retain attachments to ritual observance. In 1854,
only three years before his methodological essay on symbolic
interpretation, Hirsch attacks those reformers who too easily trade
in their Jewish rituals in order to purchase the goods of political
and civil equality:
At the marketplace of politics, where emancipation was to be purchased,
the sons of judah could be seen everywhere, trading old-style judaism for
"progress".34

Hirsch argues that true "Torah im derekh eretz" does not abandon
either traditional Jewish observance nor modern secular commitments.35 I have suggested that this is not entirely true, for Hirsch
consistently undermines historical criticism by appealing to authorial
intent. Even Hirsch is painfully aware that sacrifices are inevitable
in a world hostile to orthodox practice:
And, indeed, if most of our brethren would live as ttue jews, then most of the
conditions that now bar the jew from so many careers could be eliminated. If
only all jews who travel ot who are active in business life were to insist on
observing their duties as jews, this insistence would bring about the possibility
of fulfilling all religious requirements. Wherever he would go, the jew would
then find meals prepared in conformity with his religious standards. Then it
would be virtually no sacrifice for him to refrain from doing business on the
Sabbath ... Only due to the faithlessness of the majority does the loyalty of the
minority at present demand so many sacrifices.36

Hirsch's Judaism can flourish only in a world where his vision is
normative. Yet even in his own community in Frankfurt this is not
the case. 3 7 The reinterpretation of commandment as the symbolic

34 Samson Raphael Hirsch, "Religion Allied with Progress," The
CollectedWritings, vol. VI (New York: Philipp Feldheim, Inc., 1990), p. 108.
35 For an account of Hirsch's understanding of "Torah im Derekh Eretz"
and its relation to Orthodoxy in Frankfurt am Main, see Heinemann, "Studies
on R. Samson Raphael Hirsch (Hebrew)," pp. 249-271.
36 Hirsch, "Religion Allied with Progress," pp. 123-124.
37 See Rosenbloom, Tradition in an Age of Reform, pp. 94-120, where he
states that even in Frankfurt am Main, "this centuries-old, tradition-bound
community became one of the strongholds of the Reform movement in the
nineteenth century and served as the terrain for one of the fiercest clashes fought
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carrier of meaning is one attempt to turn sacrifice into public
acceptance, to move from minority status to normative political
practice. Hirsch's symbolic reading is one hermeneutical strategy
to provide more public space for Orthodox religious observance.
To do this, religious discourse must redefine the political and social
landscape. This is bur one way of saying that Hirsch's religious
commentary is a political and public act.

Samuel Hirsch: Religion, Symbol and the
Politics of Toleration
Samuel Hirsch's Die Humanitat ats Religion (1854), published three
years before S.R. Hirsch's Guidelines, is a collection of lectures
given to his fellow Freemasons at the Luxembourg Masonic lodge.
The impetus for the lectures, as Hirsch explains in the preface, is
the reactionary policy of Prussian Masonic lodges to exclude Jewish
membership.38 The Luxembourg lodge, which Hirsch joined after
being appointed Communal Rabbi of Luxembourg (1843), is in
his view the model religious and political community for toleration, openness, and progress. From the very ourset, Hirsch
recognizes the social and political implications of religious discourse.
He self-consciously sees himself as a religious and political leader.
Indeed, Jacob Katz describes Die Humanitat as "an attempt to
overcome the differences between the opposing religions on the

between the traditionalists and Reformers" (p. 95). And note Liberles's claim
that "Hirsch's decision to move to Frankfurt derived from his own self-image as
the champion of Judaism in the midst of the crisis of his day". See Liberles,
Religious Conflict in Social Context, p. 134.
38 See Jacob Katz,jews and Freemasonsin Europe 1723-1939 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 96-114. For a history of Jewish participation in Masonic Lodges, see Jacob Katz, "Freemasons and Jews," jewish
journal of Sociology 9 (1967), pp. 137-148. Prussian lodges were the most
reactionary, denying Jewish membership from the very beginning. This is
significant, because by 1840 there were 164 Prussian lodges with a membership
of 13,000, accounting for roughly two thirds of the entire membership in
Germany. For Hirsch's relationship to the Freemasons, see Katz, "Samuel
Hirsch-Rabbi, Philosopher and Freemason," pp. 113-126.
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basis of Masonic ideology".39 That ideology, Hirsch insists, is a
progressive politics of religious toleration. The generous quotations
from both the Hebrew Bible and New Testament attest to Hirsch's
ideologicalcommitments: Freemasonry, symbolizingthe "religion of
love and tolerance," absorbs the spirit and principles of both
Judaism and Christianity to become "the religion of the future".4o
A humanitarian religion is a politics of toleration and unification.
A contemporary, Moses Hess, criticized Hirsch for dissolving
Jewish particularity in a new "fusion of cults"; Jewish rabbis, Hess
concluded, "have now nothing better to do than to close their
Reform temples and lead their Jewish parishioners into the temple
of Freemasonry".41 In response to Hess's attack, Samuel Hirsch
defended his view of religion in Die Humanitat:
I have already demonstrated in lectures held in the Lodge that Masonry amounts
to nothing if it does not appropriate the basic principles of Judaism. Even the
Freemasons require Jewish principles. No! I am supposed to have demanded
that the Jews become Masons.42

Hirsch insisted that Jews need not become Freemasons, as Hess
unjustly inferred, but rather Freemasons must be more Jewish!
The principles of Judaism formed the basis of Masonic ideology.
So Freemasonry was only an external cover for the true religion of
the future: Judaism as the "religion of love and tolerance".
True politics would be Jewish politics, though not in name.
We have already seen that Samson Raphael Hirsch desired
public acceptance for Jewish religious observance despite the
"marketplace of politics". Samuel Hirsch, however, argued that
Jewish principles inform that "marketplace". Where S.R. Hirsch
spoke only to the initiated, Samuel Hirsch imagined a much

Katz, "Samuel Hirsch - Rabbi, Philosopher and Freemason," p. 113.
Samuel Hirsch, Die Humanitilf als Religion, (Trier: C. Troschel, 1854),
p. 248. All further quotations will be cited in text.
41 Moses Hess, "Rom und Jerusalem, die letzte Nationalitai:sfrage,"
in Ausgewiihlte Schriften, ed. Horst Lademacher (Kaln: Joseph Melzer, 1962),
p.262.
42 Quote taken from Gershon Greenberg, "The Reformers' First Attack
upon Hess' Rome and Jerusalem: An Unpublished Manuscript of Samuel
Hirsch," Jewish Social Studies 35.3 (1973), p. 195.
39

40
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broader audience - an audience that would certainly be far more
hostile to his claim that Judaism was the most tolerant and
universal of religions. So Jewish politics required subversive discourse, in which Freemasonry would undermine public hostility
to Jewish emancipation without overtly appealing to Jewish
principles. The means to effect this political shift would be a
renewed investigation into religious symbolism.
Hirsch claims, initially, that symbols are the perfect and complete
embodiment of the truths they represent. They communicate
"immediately" eternal truths. But as he works through the distinctions among natural, artistic, and religious symbols, his explanation
of symbolic meaning changes substantially. By the time Hirsch
explains the meaning of religious cultic activity, symbols no longer
perfectly correspond to the eternal truths. Instead, true ideas God's unity and oneness, the ultimate triumph of good over
evil - are not restricted to a finite set of symbolic forms. Multiple
symbols, each tied to particular social and historical periods, mediate
these truths to local communities. In the initial explanation, symbols
perfectly translate the ideas as they are in themselves. But later,
symbols refer to the ideas as they appear to finite human beings,
limited to cultural, historical, and social understanding. Hirsch,
in the end, calls the former theory pagan worship. The latter
interpretation - where symbols are inescapably bound to particular
historical periods - develops into a politics of religious toleration.
This transition, based on the Kantian distinction between things-inthemselves and things-as-they-are-for-us, underscores the political
character of Hirsch's symbolic interpretation of religion. A Jewish
politics of emancipation relies upon the power of particular religious
symbols to disclose universal truths.
If for S.R. Hirsch human beings naturally express their desires
and thoughts through symbolic activity, then for Samuel Hirsch,
those desires and thoughts are revealed through religious activity.
Hirsch begins his lectures with a paraphrase of Feuerbach's
interpretation of religion:
Religion is anthropology, it is teaching [Lehre] from the innermost being of man
and humanity. This expression of Feuerbach is a true expression, but only if
understood correctly - falsely understood, it is an empty phrase (Vorworr, i).
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Hirsch appeals to a basic human nature shared by all. Difference
does not go all the way down. Properly conceived, religion is
"essential, necessary, and intrinsic" to the concept of personhood,
and will only cease with the destruction of humanity itself. Not
something made nor found, religious life is a necessary human
activity and experience. To be human is to be a religious being.
At the core of all activity is a shared religious sensitivity.
Hirsch specifies this universal religious nature as Arbeit - the
essence of religion and "the concept of humanity". Not every
human activity counts as Arbeit. It is a special kind of spiritual
activity, "in which a definite goal is known and the correct means
are applied to achieve that goal". Through directed activity,
human beings, in the image of God, "control the earth" and
"stamp the earth with the seal of our spirit": "Creation, through
our activity, will be perfected" (37-38, 42). Through Arbeit, we
view each other as "fellowbeings" [Mitmenschen] who express
human freedom in the capacity to rule the earth; Arbeit, as the
essence of religion, is also the essence of political and communal
engagement. Public religion builds unifying relationships of love,
represented in the universal brotherhood of Freemasonry:
In the Masonic lodge true freedom prevails. We want only free beings, that is,
beings who understand that freedom is gained in and through their activity
[Arbeit] ... In the end, the Masonic lodge is an image [Bild] of honorable
brotherly love ... We accomplish in life what the Masonic Lodge symbolically
[sinnbildlich] teaches us (54).

Human freedom is enacted through the outward expression of the
religious self. To be human, in Hirsch's interpretation of Arbeit, is
now to be a religious and political animal. The "religion of the
furure", in which toleration and love transform human interaction,
begins with Arbeit, and ends in the Freemason communiry. Religion
has become political praxis, and an integrative one at that.
Hirsch's public religion is a world of fellow beings in a universal
community of love and mutual respect. Religion builds personal
relations between "Mitmenschen", now viewed as compatriots in
perfecting God's creation. Arbeit, as the "concept of humanity",
represents the human responsibility to fulfill its obligations to
God. Recall that S.R. Hirsch imagines the covenant as a handshake
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between human beings and God. For Samuel Hirsch, unifying
relations among fellow beings enacts the covenant. Indeed, the
title of his lectures, "Humanitarianism as Religion", indicates that
divine worship translates into public policy. The contrast between
S.R. Hirsch's handshake, and Samuel Hirsch's "Arbeit", is a
contrast that ideologically divides the Orthodox from the Reform.
For the Orthodox Hirsch, religious worship is public service that
builds personal relations between Jews and their God. For the
Reform Hirsch, religious worship is social and political activity that
fortifies tolerant relations among others.
Samuel Hirsch's theory of religious symbol develops our of his
discussion of Arbeit as religious and political activity. The transition is effected through a discussion of art that draws heavily from
the Platonic, or more accurately the Plotinus tradition of ideal
forms.43 Hirsch describes a carpenter who, before constructing
a chair, must have in mind the "idea of the whole". The builder
imagines the perfect form (chairness) to which the physical chair
corresponds.But the activity [Arbeit] of construction often deviates
from the original and pure theoretical idea. In cases where the
translation from theory to practice becomes difficult or confusing,
the carpenter "no longer depends upon the idea in his head, bur
rather wants to see this idea of activity before him" (127). Hirsch's
carpenter requires a perfect material translation of the idea of
chairness in order to better construct the most suitable chair. The
sign that transports the non-material idea into a recognizable
material reality is the symbol. In "Kunst" (art), the carpenter
discovers a reality that fully corresponds to the ideal forms:
Here [in art] the symbol of the idea is not merely a means for the materialization
of the idea, but rather serves to immediately present the idea (127).

The symbol is not a translation of the formal, true idea, but
rather its perfect incarnation. It does not mediate, but reveal. The
artist communicates the perfect idea in a form (symbol) that
"immediately" corresponds to its content.

43 1 thank David Dawson for pointing out the correlation between Hirsch's
theory of art and Plotinus's reinterpretation of Plato's account of ideal forms.
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The carpenter's problem, Hirsch emphasizes, is that the individual chair of his creation cannot "immediately" present the idea in
full. Each tree or fruit, for example, is one "realization of the eternal
idea, the idea of fruit or tree". But since the idea is "eternal and
omnipresent", each individual fruit or tree cannot fully encapsulate
or correspond to the idea. The artist, however, envisions the form,
and not the particular instance of the idea. In each apple, the painter
recognizes the "Urbilde" (the archetype), portrays it, and creates the
"true apple", "not a mere copy or imitation of the natural thing, but
rather the real [wirklich] that is found in the idea itself":
The mystery, a need of Spirit, the need to see the idea in a thing, is solved in
reality for all through art.
The painter of everyday life, the historical painter, the sculptor, even the pottrait
painter understands with his ingenious eye this idea, and brings the idea completely in anyone situation to presentation, and everyone is moved to feel it (128).

In Hirsch's symbolic theory, the artist44 perfects nature.

She
observes the material embodiment of the idea that is only vaguely
disclosed to the carpenter, and unveils it "immediately" before
him. Her symbolic painting is therefore not a "mere copy or
imitation", but a more perfect rendering of eternal ideas. Here
we witness at least one strain of the romantic influence upon
Hirsch's theory of symbol, in which the artistic symbol is not
the mere carrier of revelation, but is itself a revelatory event.45
For S.R. Hirsch, symbols uncover latent, obscure meanings in
nature and thing. So too for Samuel Hirsch's account of artistic
symbol as an act of disclosure. But the artist does more than
merely disclose meaning, she also perfects nature. A power that

44 Notice Hitsch's expansion of artistic expression from painter (Maler) to
encompass a broader spectrum of art which, as we shall see, includes rhe poet
as well.
45 For the romantic conception of how art reveals eternal harmony and
unity, rather than merely imitates or copies nature, see Todorov, Theories of the
Symbol, pp. 147 --189. In Representation and Its Discontents, Seyhan argues against
this reading, focusing instead on the early romantics's obsession wirh the crisis
of representing the absolute. Romantic texts "suggest that since no scientific
principle or method can reveal the absolute or absolute time, the latter can only
be indirectly understood through artisric representation". "The investigation and
appropriation or appropriative representation of otherness," Seyhan adds later,
"constitures the essential gesture of Romantic hermeneutics" (pp. 12, 23).
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S.R. Hirsch respectfully leaves to God, Samuel Hirsch now transfers
to the artist. S.R. Hirsch's heavenly politics -- the handshake
between human beings and God -- has become thoroughly human.
This should not surprise us, for Arbeit is a distinctly human
activity that unifies diverse human achievements. The artist merely
caprures the universal idea underlying all human response. Nature
only vaguely signifies eternal ideas, where art reveals them in full.
Even in specific symbolic human activity, "the idea never appears
entirely". The artist discloses the idea "better and truer, that is,
more accurately" than "the reality of life" (128). This is most
evident in poetry, Hirsch claims, for we feel after reading a poem
that the poem itself contains "the entire idea". But even this
artistic perfection is not enough to satisfy our need to discover
eternal ideas in reality:
We have the need to see the whole idea as such, completely and in its purity.
Not merely to understand it as an inner reality in thought, but rather to grasp
it as an outer reality before our spiritual but corporeal eyes (128).

This visionary need can only be satisfied in religious activity [der
Cultus]. The religious cult is "the art of religion" and "the art of
life". Like art, music and poetry, religious activity discloses the idea
"completely and in its purity". If art perfects nature, then religious
symbolic activity completes what still remains incomplete in art:
Just as life finds its center in the religious idea, and just as human life needs the
arts in order to become truly human, so too all the arts find their rightful center
in the true religious activity [Cultus] that corresponds to the idea (129).

Art reveals to us true ideas, but in religious activity we experience
these truths fully and completely through our material, worldly,
though no less spiritual vision. For symbol to be fully efficacious,
it must become public activity.
The eternal truths experienced in religious activity correspond,
in Hirsch's analogy, to "the Platonic sun". Without the Cuttus, we
remain in the darkness of the cave, lost and disillusioned. But in
religious activity, human beings flourish, warmed and illumined by
eternal truths (129):
Since religious activity [Cultus] is the symbolic expression of the idea of life,
so too must it comprise all of life, to symbolically represent the entire idea
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[die ganze Idee sinnbildlich darstellen]. Religious activity comprises the
entire human being, as much as in his entire secular life as in his entire inner
being (130).
Public religious activity [offentlicher Cultus] extols us. It brings us to the
consciousness that humanity is one and that every human being can and should
be a valued part in this whole (138).

The terminological shift from "Cultus" to the "offentlicher Cultus"
is not accidental. It is part of Hirsch's extended claim that religion
can be the unifying force in public policy. Even more, it underlies
his defense of Freemasonry: "To the Freemasons we need not say
much about what the common Cultus is and how it fulfills human
needs. Our symbolic assemblies are nothing other than a common
Cultus [gemeinsamer Culrus]" (138). The transition from "Cultus"
to "offentlicher Culrus", and finally to "gemeinsamer Cultus" ,
signifies a significant move from the private to the political, from
the particular to a shared public religious activity. Freemasonry
represents universal, religious and political activity that, like
Plato's sun, enlightens and enlivens human experience. No one
community or religious tradition can claim ownership to the sun's
spirirual power. Only the Masonic lodge, common and open to
all, illumines "all of life" in its "secular" (political) and "inner"
(religious) being.
But what of those other communities, the symbolic activities of
other religious traditions that lack the openness of Freemasonry? If
one recognizes all religious activity as symbolic, then even the
animal sacrifices in ancient Judaism are "understandable from this
historical perspective". Because all require cultic activity to experience eternal ideas in physical, public reality, every act of religious
worship represents "the activity of ideal humanity" in symbolic
form. While no longer comprehending the meaning of the sacrificial
alter, one can still recognize its representational power, even if such
activity is "unsuitable" for moderns (140). A symbolic reading of
religious activity promotes toleration and respect for difference.
Hirsch's interpretation
of symbolic activity has undergone a
significant change. Originally, religious symbolic activity perfected
the still abstract representation of true ideas in art. In the religious
Cultus, human beings discovered these eternal truths in human
activity (Arbeit) "immediately" and "entirely". But in his defense
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of religious toleration, Hirsch modifies his approach to symbolic
activity. Cultic performance represents the truth, but is itself not a
complete revelatory event. Symbol is no longer compared to "Plato's
sun", nor is it a translucent signifier of eternal ideas. Instead,
symbolic activity is one particular form that mediates the content of
eternal truths. Though universal ideas are always represented in
symbolic activity, this symbolic form changes through history:
He [the free human being] will not be indifferent to religious activity; he will
strive to make his religion [Culrus], the religion to which he belongs, a true
expression of his spiritual life. But this striving will be endured with tolerance
and respect for every other form of religion, for these other symbolic activities
represent the inner life of his fellow creatures [Mitmenschen]. All the religions
[eulte] in the end will be united, but the means must be as different as there
are various degrees of culture and human development (142).
We work under different forms yet we all recognize only one goal and know that
the variety of forms will not injure the unity and uniformity of the ideal (142).

Religious activity "is only the symbol, only the representation of
life, and not life itself' (142). If the symbol once disclosed the idea
"completely and in its purity", now it becomes one of many
pointers to truth. Unlike the "eternal idea", symbolic expression is
relative to cultural and historical conditions and sensibilities.46
Tolerance demands it.
Intolerance results when symbolic activity is thought to capture
"in its purity" the eternal ideas. Paganism, in Hirsch's taxonomy,
confuses appearance with ultimate reality:
Human activity as religious activity is considered by paganism not only as a
symbol, as a representation of life and the activity in life, but also as a real, true
service to God. God really drinks, according to the pagan conception, the blood
of the sacrifice and really consumes its fat (141).

46 Note Hirsch's interpretation of Hebrew scripture: "To us, it does not
matter how the truth is expressed, but only what has been proclaimed as the
truth ... For us, only the thoughts are important that were put in the mouth of
Abraham and Moses. These thoughts exist [sind vorhanden]. If Abraham and
Moses had not spoken them, then some person living at a later time had put
these words in Abraham and Moses's mouth. This later person [and not Moses
and Abraham] had these thoughts, but these thoughts remain no less grand or
true in his mouth, than in the mouth of a Abraham." See Hirsch, Humanitiit als
Religion, pp. 213-214.
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Cultic activity is symbolic, pointing or referring to eternal truths.
Bur pagans mistakenly believe that their religious activity captures
the truth wholly without remainder. They mistake the things-inthemselves for things-as-they-appear-to-us. Hirsch's earlier discussion of artistic symbolic activity as immediate revelation, where
eternal truths were captured in art, must now be considered pagan
worship. Symbols mediate truths, rather than immediately present
them. The "Urbilde" or the "real that is found in the idea itself"
can no longer be wholly discovered in religious activity. Samuel
Hirsch is forced to modify his initial account of symbol in order to
challenge misguided, "intolerant" conceptions of religious activity.
What accounts for Samuel Hirsch's retreat from his original
interpretation of symbol? We can see in the displacement of symbol
as transparent revealer to relative signifier Hirsch's hermeneutical
strategy to defend Jewish religious practice in the wake of social
and political intolerance. While Hirsch himself finds many of these
ancient Jewish practices objectionable (247), his symbolic reading
is not so much a critique of Judaism as it is a political challenge
to Christian conceptions of Jewish religious practice and belief.
Recall that Hirsch's lectures at the Masonic lodge in Luxembourg
were written to challenge Prussian lodges that denied Jewish
membership. As Jacob Katz argues, Freemasonry in Germany
reflected the broader social and political landscape. The Prussian
lodges merely exposed the dominant socio-political demand: Jews
must abandon ritual observance to purchase an entry ticket into
European culture. 47
Hirsch's is a rhetorical strategy designed, in part, to challenge this
political and social policy.48Even ifJewish religious practice is often

47 See Katz, jews and Freemasonsin Europe 1723-1939, pp. 1-5; and
Katz, "Freemasons and Jews," pp. 137-148.
48 Thiemann's discussion concerning the critical power of religious traditions to challenge democratic polities fits well with Hirsch's agenda: "From time
to time these societies need to be called to account by reference to a higher
standard of justice than that to which they ordinarily give allegiance. Religious
traditions are often the source for those standards, and religious discourse will
often be the vehicle for both critique and renewal. And when religious traditions
are employed in that fashion, they become part of the proper public discourse
of democratic societies." See Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, p. 88.
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"unsuitable", it is nonetheless "understandable" from a tolerant
historical perspective. Contemporaries like Hess and later socialhistorians like Katz misunderstand Hirsch's critique: not Judaism, but
European society must be transformed, a reformation that begins
with the advancement of Jewish membership in Prussian Masonic
lodges. Hirsch's interpretation of Arbeit as religious and political
activity offers the conceptual tools to help effect political change.
This becomes clear in Hirsch's correlation of Passover with
Christmas. Like Passover, the birth of Christ represents the "idea
of humanity" in a single event. Both holidays symbolize eternal
principles: the victory and eternity of truth over error, virtue over
vice, the good life and justice over misery and evil. Through "the
truth of Christ", the holy spirit enters the world, and in "the ten
words of Sinai", the instruction of Israel becomes the property of
the world. These holidays are not merely "festivals to remember
historical facts", but represent the same basic principles:
So in Christianity as in Judaism is acknowledged always the one idea, the eternal
idea of humanity, there in the person of Christ, here in the people of God (145).

The Christian Sunday and the Jewish Sabbath both represent
human mastery over nature. Christianity is therefore only an alternative symbolic expression of truths originally found in Judaism.
But Jewish originality confers authority and authenticity:
Judaism discovered and expressed the true principle long before Christianity (223).
To the Jews Jesus could bring no new teachings - for their old writings
contained the same teachings, the same axioms, the same principles as Jesus had
taught and proclaimed (226).
To merely call oneself Christian, to merely confess to the truth of Christianity
as was taught by Jesus: this the Jews who lived at the time of Jesus did as well
and as passionately as Christians today (227).

Christianity is but Judaism in another name: the content is the
same, only the form has changed. This is not a call for Jews to
join Masonic lodges, as Moses Hess would have it. Instead, these
lodges, and Christianity itself, must become more Jewish. The
"religion of the future" may be Judaism in the form of Freemasonry, but it is Jewish nonetheless. Religious symbolism, if
properly understood, promotes the religious and political toleration
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required for Jewish access to the goods of European society. And
this is possible because that society, in Hirsch's symbolic reading,
is Jewish to the core.

Conclusion
Samuel Hirsch is less than tolerant to non-Western religions.
Buddhism is condemned for its "atheistic" tendencies and its
renunciation of worldly engagement. Egyptian religions and
Hinduism fare no better: they all result from a "false hypothesis"
(211). This should not surprise us if we understand Hirsch's
lectures at the Luxembourg lodge as strategic attempts to open
Christian doors for Jewish entry. Hirsch's concerns are parochial,
and thus his tolerance limited.49 We find a different, though no
less restrictive agenda in Samson Raphael Hirsch's symbolic
reading of the commandments. Unconcerned with Christian symbolic reading, S.R. Hirsch need not defend what most concerns
Samuel Hirsch. Instead, S.R. Hirsch offers a "wissenscharrliche"
rereading of the commandments that provides coherence and
uniformity only for those already within the ever shrinking borders
of German Orthodoxy. Yet S.R. Hirsch's Orthodoxy, as much as
Samuel Hirsch's Reform, requires public space and acceptance for
continued Jewish observance. Their religious readings are also
political statements.
But their politics are different, and this is revealed in their
divergent symbolic readings of religion and commandment. Samuel
Hirsch defends a policy of contained pluralism, one that opens
social and political goods to all those who ascribe to the universal
principles of love and toleration. His symbolic interpretation
49 Note Jacob Katz's appraisal: "What Hirsch's theory amounted to was
the identification of freemasonry with the Judeo-Christian teachings. Theoretically this would have entailed the exclusion of the adherents of other religions
from the Masonic order. The tolerance achieved by his theory was not,
then, absolute, but limited to Jews and Christians only." See Katz, "Samuel
Hirsch - Rabbi, Philosopher and Freemason," p. 125. Also note Katz's remark
in jews and Freemasons in Europe, 1723-1939, that "Hirsch contended that
humanism could only be attained through Judaism or Christianity" (p. 127).
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integrates diverse human activity, for underlying that activity is a
shared religious sensibility (Arbeit) that points to universal truths.
Despite multiple symbolic forms, Hirsch carefully protects "the
unity and uniformity of the ideal". Conflicting religious interpretations should not blind us to the universal principles and truths
underlying them. One need not fear pluralism, for all difference is
ultimately rooted in common religious ideals. But tolerance does
not extend to those who do not accept these universal truths. Only
Freemasonry, Christianity, and Judaism pass the test. Religions
founded upon a "false hypothesis" are pushed to the margins of
political discourse. But Judaism is not one of those religions. It
should therefore be fully integrated within the social and political
life of nineteenth-century
German culture. Jewish ritual practice
refers to the same universal truths as many other religions, and
certainly does so "long before" Christianity.
S.R. Hirsch does not emphasize common religious ideals, bur
instead focuses upon the uniform interpretation of religious texts. To
be sure, Hirsch's reading of tefillin appeals to the universal truths
of human freedom and free will. Yet "the unity and uniformity of
the ideal" is not his concern. Instead, he fears multiple religious
interpretations of the commandments. If Samuel Hirsch requires
uniformity in religious truths, then S.R. Hirsch demands uniformity in symbolic readings of the commandments. Samuel Hirsch
would certainly find S.R. Hirsch's program a troubling one, for it
undermines the commitment to a pluralistic society so necessary
for Jewish emancipation. There is no common truth among
religions so much as competing claims to hermeneutical authority.
But the "marketplace of politics" is not S.R. Hirsch's arena. All
he requires is a public, enclosed space for Jewish religious practice,
and a political policy that will protect that space. For his symbolic
reading of the commandments to be normative, S.R. Hirsch must
encourage a politics of religious protection and exclusion, one that
protects his reading of texts and excludes revisionary pressures. His
politics seeks to integrate one community by marginalizing others.
Samuel and S.R. Hirsch's political differences are rooted in how
they understand that one community. The liberal politics of
Samuel Hirsch requires a uniformity in principle, such that the
one community includes only those who ascribe to that principle.
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S.R. Hirsch's more conservative program seeks conformity in
practice. His one community is exclusive, open only to those
Orthodox Jews who comply with his symbolic reading of
the commandments. Another way of saying this would be that
S.R. Hirsch's handshake unites a particular Jewish community
with God, while Samuel Hirsch's covenant binds Jews with
tolerant others.
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'The Intellect is the Bond Between
Us and Him': Joseph B. Soloveitchik
on Divine Names and Communion
with God through the Intellect
Reinier Munk
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
The purpose of philosophy is to kn(}UJthe Creator,
for He is the real God ( ... )
but the fruit of philosophy and the result of it is
to imitate His acts accordingto one's ability. 1

The present essay is an analysis of some of the main features
in the thought of Joseph B. Soloveitchik as articulated in
"U-viqqashtem mi-sham".2 The essay will bring into focus, first
of all, Soloveitchik's interpretation of the divine names '1 am
that 1 am' and the tetragrammaton.
Secondly, the essay will
examine Soloveitchik's statement that communion with God is
achieved through the intellect.

1 Joseph ibn Tsaddiq, Sefer ha-'olam ha-qatan (ed. Horovitz. Breslau, 1903)
68, cf. ibidem, xiii, note 55. See also: I. Heinemann, Die Lehre von der
Zweckbestimmung des Menschen im griechisch-romischen Altertum und im judischen
Mittelalter (Breslau, 1926) 58.
2 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "U-viqqashtem mi-sham", in: idem, Ish hahalakha. Galuy we-nistar (Jerusalem, 1979) 115-235. The title of the essay is a
quotation from Dem. 4, 29: "And from there Thou shalt seek". All translations
of "U-viqqashtem mi-sham" are my own.
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